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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
The American Death Penalty: Constitutional
Regulation as the Distinctive Feature of
American Exceptionalism
JORDAN M. STEIKERt
After a long period of stability, the American death penalty looks
newly fragile. Several jurisdictions have recently abandoned the death
penalty following years of state legislative inactivity. Death sentencing
has declined, as have executions. Although the size of the nation's death
row has swelled, many of the condemned face no realistic prospect of
execution. Popular support for the death penalty appears more tenuous.
Many of our "peer" countries have abandoned the death penalty. Per-
haps most importantly, after years of indifference, the U.S. Supreme
Court has revealed a new willingness to examine state death penalty
practices.
The year, of course, is 1968. The end of that story is familiar. The
Court briefly flirted with judicial abolition-invalidating essentially all
prevailing statutes on Eighth Amendment grounds in 1972. But the state
legislative backlash, fueled by rising rates of violent crime, led to new
state capital statutes. The Court affirmed the basic constitutionality of
the death penalty four years later and sought to cure its acknowledged
defects through a web of regulation, inaugurating what we now regard as
the "modem era" of capital punishment.
Today, after three and a half decades of judicial regulation, we find
ourselves in seemingly familiar territory. The American death penalty
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looks newly fragile. Several jurisdictions-New Jersey, New Mexico,
Illinois, and Connecticut-have recently abandoned the death penalty
following years of state legislative inactivity. Death sentencing has dra-
matically declined-to unprecedented levels in the modern era-and
executions have declined significantly as well from their turn-of-the-mil-
lennium highs. Although the death-row population has climbed dramati-
cally over the past four decades, many of the condemned face no
realistic prospect of execution. Popular support for the death penalty
appears more tenuous with the emergence of concerns about wrongful
convictions. Virtually all of our peer countries-and all Western demo-
cratic ones-have abandoned the death penalty. Again, perhaps most
importantly, if importance is measured by its relation to the likelihood of
abolition, the U.S. Supreme Court recently has demonstrated a new will-
ingness to examine state death penalty practices, after two decades of
doctrinal retrenchment. Will this time be different?
My argument today is that the reforms and transformations of the
modern era are much more threatening to the continued retention of the
death penalty than the reforms and transformations of previous eras. In
the past, reform and abolition have not necessarily been on the same
track, notwithstanding the view of some commentators that past reforms
were essentially the harbingers or evolutionary stages of abolition. As
recently as two decades ago, regulation of the death penalty seemed con-
genial to retention, as the reforms appeared to legitimize and entrench
state capital practices. But the same regulatory reforms of the modern
era that gave new life to the American death penalty now contribute
significantly to its destabilization. Doctrines and institutions produced
by constitutional litigation have slowly created an environment less hos-
pitable to the continued robust use of the death penalty and provide a
blueprint for further reform or even abolition, but in ways that were not
anticipated by the initial reformers.
This keynote will offer a brief history of capital reforms in the
United States and argue that most reforms were not clearly or inevitably
linked to abolition of the death penalty. Contemporary reforms, on the
other hand, appear to pose a more substantial threat to continued reten-
tion of the death penalty. Many scholars have observed that the United
States is exceptional in its continued retention of capital punishment.
Our true exceptionalism, though, is in the contemporary project of
extensive regulation. The looming question is whether our regulatory
exceptionalism is compatible with our retentionist exceptionalism. For
the reasons that follow, I argue that the forms of regulation of the mod-
em era might well lead to a new (and exceptional) path to abolition.
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EARLY REFORM
Given the present status of the United States as the lone Western
democracy that retains the death penalty, it is easy to lose sight of the
quite early efforts of American civic leaders and American jurisdictions
to reform the death penalty and ameliorate its harshness. At the time of
the founding, the American states all authorized capital punishment,
having inherited the punishment from England as the ordinary response
to murder. Our Constitution appears to presume the existence of the pen-
alty with the reference to deprivations of "life" in the Due Process and
Double Jeopardy Clauses and the explicit mention of "capital" crimes in
the grand jury clause.I The death penalty was available for many crimes
apart from murder-burglary, rape, manslaughter, arson-though not so
many as the famously long list of capital crimes in England.
The same Enlightenment forces and republican ideologies that con-
tributed to our Revolution also generated skepticism about the efficacy
and desirability of the death penalty. Many of our founders-including
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and Benjamin
Rush-were familiar with Cesare Beccaria's path-breaking critique of
the death penalty2 and accordingly advocated restriction or abolition of
capital punishment.3 Perhaps the first and most significant reform of the
American death penalty came in Pennsylvania, with the decision to rec-
ognize "degrees" of murder. That decision was wholly designed to limit
the reach of the death penalty, with only murders in the first degree
authorizing the punishment of death.4
Pennsylvania's innovation spread to many other states,5 and its
decision in the 1790s to protect even some murderers from the death
penalty was a quite radical transformation. Pennsylvania's decision was
palatable in part because of the emergence of the penitentiary, which
provided incarceration as an alternative to the physical punishments and
fines that had been the staple of eighteenth-century punishment. Penn-
sylvania's recognition of degrees of murder was followed by the deci-
sion of many states, including Pennsylvania, to make many previously
capital crimes non-capital. In the early nineteenth century, many North-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Jane Grigson trans., Marsilio
Publishers 1996) (1764).
3. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 91-97 (2002); HERBERT
H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT IN AMERICA,
1972-1994, at 7 (1996).
4. HUGo ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 4 (3d ed. 1982) (recounting how
William Bradford, Pennsylvania's Attorney General, proposed the division of murder into degrees
with the understanding "[t]hat no crime whatsoever hereafter committed (except murder of the
first degree) shall be punished with death in the State of Pennsylvania").
5. Id.
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ern jurisdictions eliminated the availability of the death penalty for rape,
robbery, burglary, and arson-to the point that treason and murder
became the sole capital offenses in Northern states by 1860.6 In the
South, too, the number of capital crimes was restricted-at least as
applied to white persons, though the death penalty was available for a
wider range of crimes for African-Americans (both free and slave).7
Although some proponents of narrowing the range of death-eligible
crimes were likely motivated by broader opposition to the death pen-
alty,8 many others urged such narrowing to protect the death penalty.
This is a recurrent theme surrounding American death penalty reform-
the uneasy alliance between abolitionists and retentionists to improve the
American death penalty.9 From the retentionist perspective, broad death-
eligibility frequently caused prosecutors, judges, and especially jurors to
resist convicting "guilty" offenders based on the perceived excessive-
ness of the punishment. Excessively harsh availability of the death pen-
alty, evident in the recourse to this sort of nullification, tended to
undermine the death penalty. Thus, for retentionists, narrowing the death
penalty was a means of strengthening the death penalty rather than a step
toward eliminating it. More generally, reform of the death penalty was
often inspired not necessarily by concerns about the death penalty per se,
but triggered by a larger shift in attitudes regarding the causes of crime
and the purposes of punishment. The movement to penitentiaries,
reflecting a greater confidence in the prospects for rehabilitation (and a
correspondingly diminished belief in fundamental depravity), rendered
the death penalty less appropriate or necessary for a wide range of
offenders.10
The second significant reform of the death penalty, related to the
first, was the decision of American jurisdictions to give sentencers the
choice to withhold the death penalty-even for offenders convicted of
first-degree murder. The introduction of discretion was in part motivated
6. BANNER, supra note 3, at 131.
7. Id. at 139 ("By the Civil War capital punishment for whites was, with a few exceptions, in
practice reserved for murder throughout the South nearly as much as in the North.").
8. At the same time that many American jurisdictions were narrowing the reach of the death
penalty, a few others were abolishing it altogether. Michigan abolished the death penalty in 1846
for all crimes other than treason, followed closely by total abolition of the death penalty in Rhode
Island (1852) and Wisconsin (1853). BEDAU, supra note 4, at 21. Michigan is thus regarded as
"the first English-speaking jurisdiction in the world" to achieve abolition. Id.
9. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 3, at 156 (describing death penalty opponents' fear of
improving and thereby stabilizing capital punishment).
10. See Louis P. MASUR, RITEs OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, at 5 (1989) (arguing that recourse to the
penitentiary instead of executions reflected a "new understanding of crime and punishment"
according to which "social influences, not depravity, caused crime and that reformation, not
retribution, should govern punishments").
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by the same impulse to reduce the number of capital crimes-the fear
that jurors would "nullify" to avoid imposition of the death penalty in
particularly undeserving cases.'1 The movement toward discretion was a
long process-initiated in Tennessee in the 1830s and gradually
embraced universally by capital jurisdictions over a lengthy period (right
up to the 1950s and 1960s).12
The third major capital reform was the movement of public execu-
tions inside jail or prison walls. Again, this reform was not primarily or
even significantly a reflection of widespread doubts about the wisdom of
the death penalty; rather, the emergence of a middle class in the nine-
teenth century, which cultivated a sense of refinement and culture,
regarded public executions as the province of the "lower" elements of
society.' 3 Public executions were no longer regarded as religious, edify-
ing rituals (characterized by solemn sermons), but instead were viewed
as raucous, raw spectacles (although it is not altogether clear that the
actual practice had changed that significantly). This newly emerging
sensibility caused states to require the removal of executions from public
view beginning in the 1830s. By 1860, all Northern states, as well as
Georgia, had abolished public hangings, and much of the South banned
such hangings by the end of the nineteenth century.' 4
Abolitionists often supported privatizing executions to demonstrate
their lack of utility as a deterrent. 5 Indeed, this argument had something
of a self-fulfilling character because the prevailing deterrent value of
executions was likely diminished by privatization. But death penalty
supporters also embraced privatization based partly on a fear that the
unfavorable publicity surrounding particularly raucous or unseemly
executions would threaten the continued practice. 16 In part, the move-
ment from public to private executions reflected the changing role of
capital punishment. As the political and religious roles of the death pen-
alty diminished, and the death penalty became less a symbol of state or
church authority than an ordinary exercise of modernizing criminal jus-
11. Philip English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical
Note, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 49, 49-51 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester
M. Pierce eds., 1976).
12. BEDAU, supra note 4, at 9-12.
13. See JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK 43 (1997) (describing legislative motivation
to curtail the "spectacle" of executions and their "demoralizing" effects); MASUR, supra note 10,
at 96.
14. BANNER, supra note 3, at 154-55.
15. See BESSLER, supra note 13, at 44-45 (quoting a Massachusetts legislative report stating
that the "privatization of executions was 'a virtual abandonment of the argument that capital
punishment is calculated to deter from the commission of crime"' and describing privatization as
an "entering wedge" by opponents of the death penalty).
16. Id. at 71 (noting that "many private execution laws were enacted in the midst of credible
legislative attempts to abolish capital punishment entirely").
2013]
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tice systems, the need for public execution ceremonies likewise dimin-
ished. 7 In this respect, the decision to remove executions from public
view thus signaled a different role for capital punishment rather than an
emerging desire to end the practice altogether.
Some Southern jurisdictions retained public hangings for rape in
the early twentieth century in part, perhaps, to prevent lynching. One of
the last public executions was conducted in Kentucky in 1936. Although
the defendant had committed murder as well as rape, he was charged
only with rape so that his execution could be conducted in public view;
Kentucky law punished murder with electrocution in the state peniten-
tiary but authorized public local executions for the crime of rape.
18
The end of public hangings undoubtedly challenged some bases for
retaining the death penalty, particularly the role of public hangings in
dramatically illustrating to the public the cost of crime. In the end,
though, shielding executions from public view also deflected criticism
about the barbarity of the punishment and might simply have "adapted"
the death penalty to modern sensibilities. As one historian observed,
"[s]ome of the death penalty's later opponents looked back with mixed
feelings at what they came to see as a bad bargain, in which supporters
of capital punishment had bought off much of the opposition by agree-
ing to remove executions from public view. '"19
The same sensibilities that sought to shield the public from execu-
tions also led to efforts to humanize executions by making them less
painful and less visibly destructive of the body. Hanging gave way to
electrocution beginning in the late 1800s because inexpert hangings
could lead to prolonged death, decapitation, or some other mishap.
Despite the fact that the first electrocution was botched, refinements of
the electrocution method led to greater enthusiasm for the practice, and
many states moved from hanging to electrocution in the half century or
so between 1890 and 1950.20 Some states also moved to lethal gas (as an
alternative to either hanging or electrocution) because of the apparent
minimal pain and minimal destruction of the body; hanging could crush
the neck, electrocution could cause bums. More recently, virtually all
jurisdictions have moved to lethal injection-again based on a desire to
inflict minimal pain and minimal visible injury. Whereas in the past, part
of the punishment of death was the execution itself-the pain, humilia-
17. DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF
ABoLrTION 87-95 (2010) (describing the emergence of the "modem mode" of capital punishment
in the nineteenth century).
18. See BANNER, supra note 3, at 155-56; 10,000 See Hanging of Kentucky Negro, N.Y.
TIMES, August 15, 1936.
19. BANNER, supra note 3, at 156.
20, WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 9-11 (1974).
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tion, and degradation-in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
punishment of death gradually became the loss of life, not the manner of
death. As in the other reforms discussed above, humanizing executions
to make them less painful and less destructive of the body was not seen
as hostile to capital punishment itself by its supporters, but rather a
means of accommodating the death penalty to modern sensibilities,
again reflecting the somewhat changing role of the death penalty.
The final reform of the death penalty in the pre-modern era
involved the centralization of executions-their movement from local
administration by county officials to state administration in state peni-
tentiaries. Centralization was partly motivated by the replacement of
hangings with other forms of execution such as electrocution and lethal
gas, which required more expertise to administer. Cost was likely an
additional factor as it simply was not cost-effective or feasible for local
counties to own and operate their own electric chairs or gas chambers.
Centralization of executions also reflected a more general transition
from local, communal criminal justice practices to more bureaucratic,
hierarchical structures characteristic of modernizing societies. As with
the other reforms, few participants in the decisions of every state to shift
executions from the county to the state level, or contemporary observers
of those transitions, would have understood the movement of executions
to state prisons as an abolitionist development or as a reform that in any
significant way called into question the institution of capital punishment
itself.
Even though the reforms discussed above-narrowing of death-eli-
gibility, permitting discretionary grants of mercy, and concealing,
humanizing, and centralizing executions-were not primarily under-
stood as abolitionist measures, there nonetheless is the possibility that
the reforms put us on the path to abolition or reflected values that are
inevitably inconsistent with the continued use of the death penalty. This
sort of claim can be divided into two hypotheses. The weaker of the two
offers a highly deterministic view of these reforms. On this view, the
reforms entail the seeds of the death penalty's destruction. Narrowing
the scope of death-eligibility and requiring the exercise of discretion in
sentencing limit the total number of death sentences, making the practice
more confined, more fragile, and more subject to question. The process
of concealing, humanizing, and centralizing executions transforms
executions into marginal events marked by state shame instead of
robust, collective, social practices. On this account, deprived of its pow-
erful practical and symbolic roles, and routinely replaced by imprison-
ment for many categories of offenses, the death penalty was placed on a
path of inevitable decline and eventual abolition.
20131
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A corollary to this argument is the observation that most, if not all,
of the reforms described above were adopted in many other countries
more or less at the same time as in the United States, and in all other
Western democracies the reforms were eventually followed by the
declining use and eventual abolition of the death penalty. Hence, on this
view, the United States is simply lagging behind other countries along
the same path, and the reforms will function as important causal contrib-
utors to eventual abolition.
The problem with these hypotheses is that the reforms have in the
past and in the present happily coexisted with retention. Narrowing the
death penalty to murder has not diminished significantly the potential
pool of the condemned, in part because the United States experiences a
great deal of murder. The humanizing, concealing, and centralizing of
executions has not triggered much abolitionist momentum. Indeed, there
were far more cries of "hypocrisy" at the time these reforms were
embraced than in contemporary American discourse. Opponents of the
death penalty rarely draw attention to the muted spectacle executions
have become, perhaps fearing that the likely response would be to advo-
cate a reversion to harsher, more public forms of execution.
Moreover, the deterministic, causal thesis is undermined by the
sheer time that has elapsed since the adoption of the major pre-modem
reforms. The narrowing of death penalty eligibility to murder (and rape
in the South) began in the eighteenth century and was virtually complete
by the early twentieth century, in practice if not in law. Concealing
executions also began almost two centuries ago, and was fully accom-
plished by the 1930s. The process of humanizing executions has been an
ongoing process that dates back at least a century, as does the centraliz-
ing of executions. Thus, although many countries that have abolished the
death penalty adopted many of these same reforms and arrived on an
abolitionist path, it is hard to say that these reforms in any meaningful
sense "caused" abolition.
A more modest and more plausible account views the reforms of
the pre-modem era as the product of a set of values that powerfully
motivated abolition in other countries. Even if those reforms did not
"cause" abolition in other countries, the values that produced those
reforms and abolition elsewhere will likely motivate abolition here as
well. On this view, the civilizing, humanizing, and bureaucratic
impulses that narrowed the death penalty, centralized its administration,
and animated efforts to reduce its pain and horror, are values that inevi-
tably undermine the continued use of the death penalty.
From this perspective, though there may be bumps along the aboli-
tionist road in the United States based on some distinctive aspects of
[Vol. 67:329
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American politics, federalism, or rates of victimization and violence,
eventually "civilizing" and "humanizing" impulses will win out. Though
there is much to recommend this view, there is a strong case on the other
side. The centerpiece of that case is the notable lack of any strong
human rights-based or human dignity-based critique of the American
death penalty in contemporary American discourse. The United States
prides itself as a democratic, egalitarian, rights-based society, and yet
few contemporary opponents of the American death penalty appear to
claim that the punishment is contrary to some fundamental notion of
civilization or humanity. Indeed, such critiques of the death penalty on
the grounds of human dignity or essential human rights appeared much
more frequently in the discourse of earlier American eras. When Minne-
sota discussed abolition at the end of the nineteenth century, one legisla-
tor described the death penalty as "this harlot of judicial murder [that]
smear[s] the pages of our history . . . [and] trail[s] her crimson robes
through our Halls of Justice."'" In the debates that led to abolition in
Michigan in the 1840s, the committee recommending abolition declared,
"[N]o man hath a power to destroy life but by commission from God,
the author of it."
22
These are not the sort of sentiments frequently aired in or endorsed
by contemporary legislatures (particularly in retentionist states). In fact,
most of the anti-death penalty discourse in contemporary debates is
pragmatic and utilitarian rather than rooted in deontological conceptions
of human rights or religious commands. Opponents of the death penalty
emphasize its cost, its arbitrary or discriminatory distribution, and the
risk of executing the innocent. Moreover, the pragmatic focus has been
self-consciously embraced in light of the widespread perception that
Americans have much less discomfort with capital punishment as a pun-
ishment than with its prevailing administration. Along these lines, the
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, a leader in American
anti-death penalty advocacy, tellingly propounds "Ten Reasons Why
Capital Punishment is Flawed Public Policy" as the centerpiece of its
web-based advocacy. 23 Even the two human rights-based and religious-
based arguments appearing on that list ("Capital Punishment goes
against almost every religion" and "The U.S. is keeping company with
notorious human rights abusers"2 4 ) seem to be one step removed from
21. BESSLER, supra note 13, at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. JOHN F. GALLIHER ET AL., AMERICA WITHOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 15 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
23. Death Penalty Overview: Ten Reasons Why Capital Punishment is Flawed Public Policy,
NAT'L COALITION TO ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/index.cfm?content=5 (last
visited Oct. 10, 2012) (emphasis added).
24. Id.
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directly asserting the immorality of the death penalty.
The reluctance to condemn the death penalty on absolutist moral
grounds is perhaps best illustrated by the tact of contemporary American
opponents to advocate legislative "repeal" of the death penalty rather
than using the morally fraught term "abolition."25 Such a strategy avoids
the implication that the decision to end the practice is morally compelled
to the same extent as the duty to end slavery. "Repeal" also suggests that
the decision to withdraw the death penalty need not be a permanent or
irreversible one.
Thus, while the reforms of the pre-modern era might carry the
seeds of an attack based on emerging norms of civility and humanity,
those seeds do not appear to be particularly ripe. And though we have
traveled on the same road as most abolitionist states in many of our
common reforms, it is not obvious that the road cannot maintain a divide
at the end, with one abolitionist path and the other retentionist. The
question remains whether the reforms of the present era-most of which
are distinctive to the American experience-are similarly able to coexist
with retention.
REFORMS OF THE MODERN ERA
The modem era of the death penalty was inaugurated by the strik-
ing decline in death sentences and executions in the 1960s. Those
declines, together with a myriad of social and political forces, including
the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War, prompted a rethinking
of the role of capital punishment in America. Prior to the late 1950s, the
United States had experienced a four-decade period in which no Ameri-
can state had abolished the death penalty.2 6 But over the next decade,
Alaska and Hawaii entered the Union as abolitionist states (having abol-
ished the death penalty as territories just before statehood), and Dela-
ware, Oregon, Iowa, West Virginia, Vermont, and New York all
abolished the death penalty for ordinary murder, with some of those
states securing total abolition. 7
In addition to these political developments, the death penalty for
the first time in American history became subject to significant legal
regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court first signaled the possibility of
meaningful federal constitutional regulation in 1963, when three justices
25. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous
Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 675-76 (2010) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker,
Century].
26. Bowers, supra note 20, at 7. Delaware abolished the death penalty in 1958 but reinstated
it in 1961. Id.
27. Id. at 6-7.
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urged the Court (unsuccessfully) to decide whether the death penalty is
excessive when imposed for the crime of rape.28 Just a year before, the
Court had "incorporated" the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments and applied it against the states via the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.29
Emboldened by the apparent interest of some members of the Court
in regulating the American death penalty, and as well by the Warren
Court's dramatically increasing role in supervising state criminal
processes, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund launched an attack on capi-
tal punishment, in part because of its manifestly discriminatory adminis-
tration, particularly in rape cases. The LDF, through its "moratorium
strategy" of challenging capital sentences in every jurisdiction based on
all available constitutional grounds, managed to bring executions to a
halt by 1967." o Five years later, in Furman v. Georgia,3 the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated prevailing capital statutes based largely on
their failure to guide sentencer discretion; states had authorized the death
penalty for a wide range of crimes, including murder and rape, yet only
a fraction of persons convicted of such offenses had actually been sen-
tenced to death (much less executed).3 2 The looming gap between death-
eligibility and actual sentencing practices, together with the failure of
states to endorse any conception of "the worst of the worst" offenses or
offenders, led the Court to find the status quo intolerably arbitrary.3 3
Only two Justices-Brennan and Marshall-concluded that the death
penalty was in all cases contrary to evolving standards of decency,34 and
in the wake of the Court's decision, states passed new capital statutes
with an eye toward limiting or abolishing sentencer discretion to comply
with the Court's mandate.35 Four years later, in 1976, the Court
reviewed five of the new statutes, upholding three schemes that confined
the death penalty to "aggravated" murder via specially enumerated cir-
cumstances, and striking down two schemes that made the death penalty
28. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889-91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas and
Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
29. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding incarceration to be excessive
punishment for the crime of "addiction" to a controlled substance).
30. See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 106-08, 113-14 (1973) (describing moratorium strategy).
31. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
32. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. Rav. 355, 364-69
(1995) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Sober] (describing the constitutional concerns supporting
the result in Furman).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 362.
35. Id. at 363.
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mandatory for certain offenses.3 6
The "modem" American death penalty consists of the regime pro-
duced in the wake of the Court's landmark decisions in 1972 and 1976
and its subsequent (and continuing) regulatory efforts. Those decisions
spawned numerous core doctrines, including the requirements that states
"narrow" the class of the death-eligible through the use of at least one
non-vague aggravating factor,37 that states facilitate robust consideration
of a defendant's mitigating evidence (broadly construed),3" and that
states withhold the death penalty from offenders deemed undeserving by
contemporary standards (including juveniles,39 persons with mental
retardation,40 persons convicted of rape and other non-homicidal ordi-
nary offenses,41 and persons convicted based on the actions of another
who were not themselves major participants in the offense42 ). In addi-
tion, the Court has developed numerous doctrines regulating other fun-
damental aspects of capital proceedings, such as the selection and
exclusion of potential capital jurors43 and the minimal requirements for
effective capital investigation and representation." In the dozens-
indeed hundreds-of capital cases in which the Court has issued merits
decisions over the past four post-Furman decades, the Court has
addressed many other aspects of capital litigation, including permissible
types of prosecutorial argument,45 the circumstances under which death-
sentenced inmates may assert their factual innocence based on newly-
discovered evidence,46 and the requisite mental bearing for condemned
prisoners at the time of their execution.47
Looking back from the present, it is clear that the foundational
cases of the 1970s heralded a new era in which courts would play a
much more substantial role in the American capital system. The prolifer-
ation of doctrines and sub-doctrines touching all aspects of the capital
process-from the investigation of crime, the conduct of both prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys, jury selection, jury instructions, and so on-
certainly have transformed the American death penalty. However, the
36. Id. at 361, 363-70.
37. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-78 (1983).
38. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 283-88 (2004).
39. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
40. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
41. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446-47 (2008).
42. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
43. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29, 735, 739 (1992); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968).
44. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-86, 389-90 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 533-34. 538 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 398-99 (2000).
45. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 (1985).
46. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 404, 411 (1993).
47. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
[Vol. 67:329
THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY
most important changes might not be reflected in the content of those
doctrines so much as the process by which they are enforced. Indeed, the
actual requirements imposed on states in administering the death penalty
are less strenuous than the legions of cases heard and decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court would suggest.48 A disproportionate number of
those cases focus less on the substantive commands of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments than on procedural questions surrounding their
enforcement. 9 In 1996, with the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act," Congress substantially curtailed the ability of
federal courts to engage in de novo review of state court decisions deny-
ing relief on federal claims. Over the past fifteen years, the lower federal
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court have spent an extraordinary amount
of time analyzing the consequences of those changes, and a significant
percentage of federal habeas litigation is devoted to ascertaining whether
the federal courts can reach the merits of constitutional claims surround-
ing the implementation of the death penalty (as opposed to the merits
themselves).5
The constitutionalization or legalization of the death penalty-the
process of subjecting every aspect of the capital process to federal legal
norms and standards (even if quite minimal)-has created a new cadre
of lawyers specializing in capital litigation. Many active death penalty
states have transferred the responsibility for defending capital convic-
tions and sentences from local district attorneys to lawyers within state
attorney general offices who have particular knowledge about the opera-
tion of federal habeas and constitutional law applicable to the death
penalty.
On the defense side, capital trial representation, state post-convic-
tion representation, and capital litigation in federal habeas have become
distinct professional roles. Before the modern era, capital cases were
handled by appointed lawyers who generally had no specialized knowl-
edge or training related to the death penalty (or post-conviction proce-
dure). Capital appeals and post-conviction were likewise handled by
"generalist" lawyers with no particular training or expertise. The LDF's
efforts in the 1960s marked the first time in American history that capi-
tal litigation became a distinctive practice, and the Court's decisions
48. Steiker & Steiker, Sober, supra note 32, at 402 (describing the quite minimal demands of
contemporary capital doctrines, notwithstanding their complexity).
49. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims
Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CI.
LEGAL F. 315, 317 (1998).
50. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. I, sec.
107(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221(amending 28 U.S.C. § 153 (1994)).
51. Steiker, supra note 49, at 315-17.
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announcing constitutional limitations on the death penalty generated a
need for greater specialization and training. The transformation of capi-
tal representation has taken several decades (it was still not uncommon
for "generalist" lawyers to represent capital defendants at trials in the
1970s and early 1980s). Today, though, a group of professional capital
litigators engages in direct representation and post-conviction represen-
tation of capital defendants and inmates, and these litigators also provide
support and consulting for private criminal defense lawyers who work
on these cases. This is not to say that every capital case is actually liti-
gated by expertly-trained and professionally-committed capital liti-
gators. But many dozens-indeed hundreds-of these professionals are
involved in capital litigation nationwide, and their presence reinforces
the role of legal regulation in the American death penalty. Just as the
LDF shared pleadings and strategies in its moratorium effort, so too do
contemporary capital litigators collaborate in designing and refining
legal claims (as well as conducting trainings to ensure wide availability
of the prevailing standard of practice). As a result, in many, if not most,
capital cases, the work of professional capital litigators will be reflected
in the range and quality of claims raised and litigated through multiple
stages of the process.
A particularly telling example of the coordination and sophistica-
tion of capital defense lawyers can be found in the recent rounds of
lethal injection litigation. Claims surrounding lethal injection protocols
have been pursued vigorously in virtually every death penalty jurisdic-
tion in the country with significant success in forcing jurisdictions to
reconsider or redesign their procedures, notwithstanding the U.S.
Supreme Court's rejection of a challenge to Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol in 2008.52
Overall, the Court's articulation of an extensive body of capital
doctrines as well as a dense thicket of procedural rules governing their
enforcement has transformed the American death penalty most funda-
mentally by extending the time between death sentences and executions.
Throughout most of our history, weeks or maybe months separated the
pronouncement of sentence and the ultimate execution.53 Today, the sep-
aration is measured by years or decades in active executing states.54 In a
larger group of inactive states, the separation is simply immeasurable
because the imposition of legal constraints (in conjunction with other
political and social forces) has created a de facto moratorium on execu-
tions (except, perhaps, for "volunteers" who seek execution by waiving
52. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion).
53. Steiker & Steiker, Century, supra note 25, at 663.
54. Id. at 679.
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their appeals).55 Constitutionalization and proceduralization have created
the new "death row phenomenon": long-term confinement by many pris-
oners awaiting execution.56 Whereas the accumulation of inmates in the
late 1960s reached about 600 inmates nationwide,57 which was regarded
as an extraordinary number at that time, today there are several thousand
inmates languishing on death row (more than 700 in California
alone58).59
This phenomenon destabilizes the death penalty in numerous ways.
First, extending the time between sentence and execution undercuts two
of the most pressing pro-death penalty arguments: deterrence and retri-
bution. Deterrence is attenuated when it is widely understood that an
execution will not occur until many years after sentence, if at all. Moreo-
ver, the retributive value of executions is diminished when the person
executed has lived a "second lifetime" on death row.60 Given that the
death-sentencing decision now encompasses a broad inquiry into a
defendant's background and character, a lengthy gap between sentence
and execution necessarily excludes relevant information-for example,
the second life lived-from the sentencing decision (and clemency is a
poor substitute for updating the death-worthiness of the condemned). In
more colloquial terms, the death row phenomenon has prompted deep
psychological questions about whether a person executed twenty years
after the offense and sentence is the "same" person that had been con-
demned two decades earlier.
Second, the death-row phenomenon creates a new moral problem
for the death penalty, one that Justice Breyer"' and former Justice Ste-
vens62 have highlighted on several occasions. The death penalty now has
become two separate punishments: lengthy incarceration under very
severe conditions (essentially solitary confinement in many states) fol-
55. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the
Death Penalty in "Executing" Verstus "Symbolic" States in the United States, 84 TEx. L. REv.
1869, 1870-73 (2006) [hereinafter Staiker & Steiker, Tale].
56. Steiker & Steiker, Century, sapra note 25, at 677-78.
57. Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER (April 1, 2012), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-
row-year.
58. Id.
59. Steiker & Steiker, Tale, supra note 55, at 1870.
60. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 543 (2009) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J.,
statement respecting denial of certiorari).
61. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
62. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 542 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., statement respecting the
denial of certiorari); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114-16 (2009) (Stevens, J., statement
respecting denial of certiorari).
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lowed by an execution.6 3 Even if the public and courts are persuaded
that the death penalty itself is not an excessively cruel punishment, there
are increasing doubts about whether the present regime of lengthy soli-
tary confinement and subsequent execution is tolerable.
Third, the extensive legal regulation surrounding the death penalty,
with more substantial trials, lengthy appeals, and functionally indetermi-
nate sentences, has exponentially increased the cost of capital punish-
ment. Whereas "cost" was traditionally a pro-death penalty argument
(why should the state spend money housing inmates for life?), cost has
become decisively an anti-death penalty argument as the modem regula-
tory apparatus imposes severe costs that are difficult if not impossible to
curb.' Over the past three to five years, concerns about the cost of capi-
tal punishment have become a driving force behind efforts to repeal the
death penalty, and such concerns have contributed to the decisions of
prosecutors to forego capital sentences, with dramatic declines in death
sentencing over the past decade.
Part of the increase in capital costs is attributable to the emergence
of mitigation as the primary focus of capital litigators. Prior to the mod-
em era, the focal point of capital trials, like their non-capital counter-
parts, was the question of guilt versus innocence. Most states did not
allow the presentation of evidence unrelated to guilt or innocence,65 and
lawyers in capital cases did little if any investigation unrelated to the
commission of the offense. Lawyers in capital cases were not typically
what we would today call "death penalty lawyers"; they tended to be
generalists who approached capital cases in the same way they would
approach other serious felony cases.66
When the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated mandatory capital stat-
utes in 1976,67 the Court constitutionalized the requirement of individu-
alized sentencing. In one respect, the Court was simply recognizing the
national norm of discretion in capital cases, given the near-uniform
rejection of mandatory death-sentencing provisions by the 1960s.
But, in its elaboration and enforcement of a right to individualized
sentencing, the Court broadened considerably the range of evidence rele-
63. Steiker & Steiker, Century, supra note 25, at 677-78.
64. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 120, 136-37 (2010)
[hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Cost].
65. MELTSNER, supra note 30, at 68.
66. Cf Carol S. Steiker, Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Loeb: The Seminal Sentencing of
the Century, in TRIAL STORMS 117, 119, 122-24, 133 (Michael E. Tigar & Angela J. Davis eds.,
2007).
67. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331, 336 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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vant to the punishment decision.6" Moreover, the "professionalization"
of the capital litigation bar in response to the Court's regulatory efforts
significantly changed the scope and scale of trial defense efforts. Prior to
the 1970s, punishment phase investigation and advocacy was rudimen-
tary and secondary. By the late 1980s, the emerging norm for capital
trial representation included a comprehensive evaluation of a defen-
dant's life and circumstances. In 1989, the American Bar Association
promulgated detailed standards for the appointment and performance of
counsel in capital cases.69 Those standards outlined the wide range of
tasks necessary to effective capital trial representation, including investi-
gation into a defendant's medical history, educational history, special
educational needs, military service, employment and training history,
family and social history, and religious and cultural influences. Fourteen
years later, in its revised guidelines, the ABA described even greater
responsibilities, recognizing that effective capital representation requires
the coordination of a capital punishment team, including a professional
investigator, a "mitigation specialist," and all other pertinent profes-
sional experts.70 The defense approach contemplated under the standards
includes vigorous efforts to seek a plea based on extensive mitigation
investigation, aggressive pre-trial motion practice to assert all non-frivo-
lous challenges to the prosecution's evidence and the state capital
scheme, and informed jury selection efforts to ensure reasonable consid-
eration of mitigation evidence. Acknowledging that this sort of represen-
tation requires states to commit "substantial resources" to capital trial
defense, the ABA remarked "that any other course has weighty costs-
to be paid in money and delay if cases are reversed at later stages or in
injustice if they are not."71
The transformation of capital trial defense, reflected in the ABA
standards (though not fully in capital practice) has been destabilizing to
the continued use of the death penalty in at least two ways. First, like the
additional layers of procedural safeguards wrought by increased legal
regulation, the emergence of robust individualization and other trial
preparation standards has dramatically raised the cost of capital punish-
ment. 2 Capital trial costs are stunningly greater than their non-capital
68. See Jordan M. Steiker, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Hazards of Predicting the Future, in
DEATH PENALTY STORIES 277, 306-10 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009)
(describing the expansion of the Court's individualization principle).
69. ABA, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 31 HoFsTRA L. REV. 913, 916 (2003) (discussing the process of updating the original
guidelines adopted in 1989).
70. id. at 916, 925.
71. Id. at 930.
72. Steiker & Steiker, Cost, supra note 64, at 139-41.
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counterparts.73 Second, robust individualization uneasily fits with many
traditional and religious defenses of the death penalty because it
presumes that "an eye for an eye" is an inappropriate command; the
death penalty decision must be as much a judgment about the offender
as the offense. As capital representation increasingly becomes a sophisti-
cated, collaborative effort to avoid the imposition of a death sentence,
capital punishment becomes less common and indeed less expected as
the ordinary response even to aggravated murder. High profile cases
yielding life sentences in the wake of extensive mitigation cases, such as
those involving Terry Nichols (who participated in the Oklahoma City
bombing) and Brian Nichols (who killed a state court judge and others
while escaping from his rape trial in a Georgia courthouse), reflect the
new reality that no crimes, no matter their severity, are invariably pun-
ished by death.
The final major reform in contemporary capital practice has been
the emergence of life-without-possibility-of-parole ("LWOP") as the
primary alternative punishment to the death penalty for capital crimes.
Prior to the 1970s, LWOP was essentially non-existent within the United
States.74 LWOP first emerged in a few states in response to Furman's
invalidation of prevailing capital statutes, but its widespread adoption in
subsequent decades was driven by broader considerations. The rise of
violent crime in the 1970s and 1980s, increasing skepticism about the
rehabilitative role of prisons, and frustration with the lack of trans-
parency in criminal sentencing all contributed to more punitive sentenc-
ing regimes, which included fewer opportunities for parole. Although
death penalty opponents tended to support LWOP in death penalty states
in hopes of reducing capital sentences, the movement toward LWOP
was a crashing wave, embraced in states without the death penalty, as
well as for certain non-capital offenses in states that retained the death
penalty. But death penalty supporters recognized the danger LWOP
poses for the death penalty. In Texas, prosecutors resisted LWOP for
years, and reluctantly capitulated only after the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated the death penalty for juveniles, fearing an insufficiently
punitive or protective alternative to death in capital cases involving
juveniles.75
Although the recent, ubiquitous embrace of LWOP is not primarily
attributable to concerns about the death penalty, its effects on the death
penalty have been dramatic. The emergence of LWOP is likely the sin-
73. See generally id. at 137-50 (detailing the "new cost" of capital punishment).
74. Note, A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital
Punishment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2006).
75. Id. at 1843-44.
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gle most important causal factor in the extraordinary decline in Ameri-
can death sentencing over the past fifteen years. The number of new
death sentences has dropped almost two-thirds from the number of death
sentences obtained in the mid-1990s, from a nationwide average of 314
per year (1994-1996) to a nationwide average of 98 (2009-201 1).76
This past year saw the fewest new death sentences in the modem era, a
total of 78 nationwide. 77 LWOP provides substantial cover to prosecu-
tors who forego capital sentences, as it ameliorates concerns about recid-
ivism from the pro-death penalty side. In states like Texas, where a jury
must find a likelihood of future dangerousness before imposing the
death penalty, the elimination of parole for life-sentenced offenders
strikes at the core of the state's justification for retention.
Overall, the combined power of legal regulation, robust mitigation,
and the alternative of LWOP has made the death penalty significantly
more expensive, less frequently imposed, and less responsive to the
death penalty's main justifications. Like the reforms of the pre-modem
era, the reforms of the present day were not self-consciously adopted to
defeat the death penalty. The imposition of constitutional norms to state
capital practices was the natural outgrowth of a larger movement toward
nationalizing criminal justice standards; indeed, imposing constitutional
safeguards was the alternative to constitutional abolition. New legal
norms, in turn, transformed capital practices, such that contemporary
capital trials and appeals bear little resemblance to their pre-Furman
counterparts. Some of the transformation resulted from direct judicial
command or legislative action (e.g., the establishment of a distinct pun-
ishment phase, extensive voir dire, mandatory post-conviction review
with appointment of counsel), but some change is attributable to the cre-
ation of a professional capital punishment bar which itself was the by-
product of increased legal regulation. Likewise, LWOP developed not to
limit the death penalty but because of independent considerations.
THE MODERN PREDICAMENT: THE STORM FOLLOWING THE CALM
Is the modem version of the American death penalty a stable prac-
tice? Before Furman, the death penalty appeared particularly vulnerable.
Death-sentencing rates were declining, executions had become virtually
non-existent, several jurisdictions had severely restricted or abolished
the death penalty, public support for the death penalty (as measured by
polling data) had reached an all-time low, other Western democracies
76. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-
2008 (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
77. Id.
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were on the precipice of abolition, and the death penalty was under fed-
eral constitutional attack. The Court could have issued a fatal blow to
the death penalty, instead of its cacophonous, fractured indictment of
prevailing capital statutes in Furman.78 Furman's tentativeness, coupled
with the dramatic rise in violent crime, fueled a backlash to the Court's
decision. Instead of continued decline or constitutional abolition, the
death penalty in America was revived. States passed dozens of new capi-
tal statutes, the Court affirmed the basic constitutionality of the punish-
ment, and executions resumed less than five years later.
During the two decades following Furman, the increased legal reg-
ulation of the death penalty likely contributed to its growth. First, the
Court's decisions in 1976 upholding the new statutes explicitly dis-
avowed the language in some of the Furman concurrences insisting that
the death penalty was no longer consistent with evolving standards of
decency. In so doing, the Court gave its imprimatur to the continued use
of the punishment. As might be expected, the Court's decision did not
directly endorse capital punishment; rather, the Court framed its conclu-
sion as addressing the permissibility rather than the desirability of capi-
tal punishment.79 According to the Court, states were entitled to retain
the death penalty on retributivist and deterrence grounds; given these
legitimate objectives, the death penalty did not violate human dignity.8"
But in our culture, saying that the Constitution does not forbid a practice
often confers a special legitimacy, and the Court's embrace of the new
capital statutes undoubtedly contributed to the subsequent decline in
anti-death penalty sentiment.
Second, apart from undermining the broad moral attack on the
death penalty, the Court's assertion of ongoing regulatory oversight
blunted criticism of the states' administration of the death penalty.
Whereas prior to Furman, state capital systems entrusted the death pen-
alty decision to the unguided discretion of prosecutors and jurors, in the
post-Furman world states designed new capital statutes that gave struc-
ture to the death penalty decision. States enumerated "aggravating fac-
tors," which became indispensable to the imposition of a death sentence,
and the Court policed the application of such factors in particular cases.
As the Court declared in upholding Georgia's new statute in 1976, "[n]o
78. See Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and Contingency, 125 HARV. L. REv. 760,
780-81 (2012) (reviewing GARLAND, supra note 17 (claiming that the United States' failure to
abolish the death penalty is more contingent than some scholars claim and describing plausible
route to abolition under the Warren Court)).
79. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e cannot say that
the judgment of the Georgia Legislature that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases
is clearly wrong.").
80. Id. at 182-86.
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longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence."81
Over the next two decades, the Court reversed death sentences in
large numbers of cases, contributing to the perception that the death pen-
alty was subject to too much rather than too little regulation. 82 This per-
ception of "overregulation" became entrenched, notwithstanding the fact
that the actual demands of the Court's capital jurisprudence were quite
minimal, and the resulting distribution of the death penalty remained
quite problematic.83 Judicial intervention thus stabilized capital punish-
ment and paved the way for executions to resume without the discomfort
evident in the pre-Furman decade. Indeed, other actors in the capital
system-particularly executive officials-appeared to abdicate their
oversight responsibilities in light of the judicial takeover of the capital
system. In the first two decades of the post-Furman era, executive clem-
ency fell well below pre-Furman levels, 84 as governors deferred to the
judicial system in policing unjust executions, despite the fact that the
courts tended not to review whether particular executions were actually
justified.
By the mid-to-late 1990s, the "modem" American death penalty
appeared more stable and more robust than the death penalty it replaced.
Death sentences and executions rose to their highest levels in years,
8 5
and the population on death row grew to over three thousand inmates,
approximately seven times the size of death row in 1976.86 To this point,
the American death penalty had received the benefits of legal regula-
tion-increased legitimacy and decreased non-judicial scrutiny-but
had yet to fully experience its costs.
Over the past fifteen years, the new regime the Court set into
motion has been substantially and perhaps irrevocably undermined. The
discovery of numerous wrongfully-convicted inmates on death row, in
Illinois and elsewhere, has cast a different light on the reliability of the
capital system. These exonerations resulted in part from the emergence
of more sophisticated technologies for evaluating DNA and other foren-
sic evidence. But they also were an unanticipated consequence of the
increased regulation of the death penalty. Many of the exonerations were
uncovered because of the efforts of newly-established defense organiza-
81. Id. at 206-07.
82. See Steiker & Steiker, Sober, supra note 32, at 436.
83. See id. at 438.
84. Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in
the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7, 17 (1992) ("Executive clemency all but disappeared in the
United States in the era of hands-on federal court involvement.").
85. Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra note 76;
Executions by Year Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Nov. 13 2012), http:/
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year.
86. Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, supra note 57.
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tions, such as the Innocence Project (founded in 1992) and Northwestern
University's Center for Wrongful Convictions (founded in 1998).
Although these particular organizations do not confine their work
to capital cases, much of their success on the capital side is attributable
to two new features of the American death penalty-a network of com-
mitted capital litigators and the lengthy separation between death
sentences and executions. In most capital jurisdictions, specialized death
penalty attorneys, investigators, and mitigation experts are involved in
the representation of death-sentenced inmates, either through direct rep-
resentation or through consulting relationships. These attorneys work in
a variety of institutional settings, including state-established capital
defense organizations, state post-conviction offices, private, non-profit
capital defense groups, and federally-funded federal habeas assistance
projects. Whereas fewer than a couple of dozen or so attorneys were part
of the pre-Furman network, a much larger group of lawyers, investiga-
tors, and other specialists is involved in contemporary litigation, cer-
tainly totaling in the hundreds. Although such lawyers and specialists do
not and cannot reach every death-sentenced inmate, they provide a level
of scrutiny of capital verdicts and sentences that simply was absent
under the prior system.
Moreover, the new capital doctrines, filtered through tiers of review
in the state and federal systems, have vastly extended the time between
sentence and execution. This gap has been crucial to the exoneration
enterprise, as many of those found innocent would simply have been
executed under the old regime.87 The modern death penalty is thus char-
acterized by many more opportunities for, and actual instances of, dis-
covering the fallibility of the capital system. This dynamic-virtually
absent in the pre-Furman system-contributes to the destabilization of
the death penalty.88
The other major cost imposed by the modern regulatory system is
financial-the exponentially increased expense of trying, housing, and
executing capital offenders. During the first two decades of legal regula-
tion, states experienced only a fraction of these increased costs.
Although the Court insisted on a constitutional right to "individualized"
sentencing in the 1976 cases, capital trials were not transformed over-
87. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The
Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy,
95 J. Cium. L. & CRINNOLOGY 587, 594 (2005) (noting that one Illinois inmate came "perilously
close to execution" prior to his exoneration).
88. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative
"Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417,425-27 (2002) (discussing the abolitionist
potential of "institution-building" reforms, such as the proliferation of specialized capital defender
offices).
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night. Well into the late 1980s and early 1990s, states did not adequately
fund trial representation (often imposing absolute caps on attorneys' fees
and expert expenses), and the prevailing level of practice remained poor,
particularly in the South.89 The first interventions by the U.S. Supreme
Court on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds did not occur until
2000,90 and vigorous mitigation development and presentation did not
become the norm until the late 1990s at the earliest. At about the same
time, states began to fund state post-conviction representation in capital
cases, in part to enjoy the benefits of fast-track federal habeas review
("opt-in" status) under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act,9 though states have not received those benefits to date. Moreover,
death-row incarceration costs did not skyrocket until the 1990s. The
national death-row population did not reach 1,000 until 1982, 2,000 until
1988, 3,000 until 1995, and 3,500 until 1999 (and it has remained above
3,000 since that time).92 Furthermore, the solitary-confinement style of
death-row incarceration did not become the national norm until
recently,93 and this cost has become an increasingly large part of the
added marginal cost of the American death penalty.
94
Thus, the extraordinary rise in capital costs is a very recent phe-
nomenon, and likely a permanent one. The increased trial, appellate, and
post-conviction costs are the product of entrenched legal norms, and the
heightened incarceration costs appear to be an unavoidable public policy
concession given (perhaps exaggerated) fears of violence on the part of
death-sentenced inmates. These increased costs, together with growing
public skepticism about the accuracy of the capital system and the near-
universal embrace of LWOP as the alternative punishment to death,
have radically altered the calculus of prosecutors, who have sought
death sentences much less frequently over the past years, sending the
89. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
90. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2006).
92. Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, supra note 57.
93. Texas, for example, did not move its death row to the "super-max" facility in West
Livingston, Texas, until 1999; prior to that time, Texas death-sentenced inmates were housed in
ordinary prison cells and could participate in a work-program. See Death Row Facts, TEX.
DEPARTMENT CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death-row/dr-facts.html (last visited Oct.
19, 2012).
94. See, e.g., Arthur L. Alarc6n & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A
Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature's Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty
Debacle, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REv. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S41, S107 n.239 (2011) (indicating that death-
row incarceration in California costs an additional $100,663 per death row inmate in 2010, or over
$71 million for the 713 death-sentenced inmates on California's death row).
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absolute number of death sentences to modem-era lows. 95 Last year
marked the first time in the modem era that death sentences nationwide
dipped below one hundred, and the seventy-eight death sentences
represent less than one-third the number of sentences obtained in any
year between 1982 and 1999 (and one-quarter the number obtained in
the peak 1994-1996 years).96 This precipitous decline in death sentences
is not attributable to the also-noteworthy decline in murders,97 as the
death-sentencing rate (death sentences per murder) has also declined
remarkably over the past thirteen years. 98
The dramatic decline in death sentencing might reflect a passing
moment, much like the decline in the decade leading up to Furman.
Perhaps a return of the high violent crime rates of the 1970s and 1980s
would fuel another explosion in death sentences. But the hallmarks of
the modem regime-exorbitant capital costs, increased scrutiny of capi-
tal verdicts and sentences through a professionalized capital bar, and the
establishment of LWOP as the norm for capital murder-constitute
institutional pressures against death sentencing. Those institutional pres-
sures, in turn, have a feedback loop to legal regulation. One of the major
concerns in Furman was the rarity of the death sentences as a response
to death-eligible crimes. In the words of Justice White, commenting on
the administration of the death penalty in the pre-Furman era, "the pen-
alty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenu-
ated to be of substantial service to criminal justice." 99 The increase in
death sentencing and executions over the following twenty-five years
insulated the death penalty from this sort of challenge, but the recent
dramatic declines give contemporary force to that argument. Thus, legal
regulation of the death penalty can reduce use of the death penalty,
which in turn carries the potential for greater legal regulation, including
abolition.
Moreover, the same institutional pressures contributing to the
decline in death sentencing have recently led to repeal in several juris-
dictions, including New Jersey, New Mexico, Connecticut, and Illinois.
These legislative reversals, though significant in themselves, are also
significant to the prospects for judicial abolition. Over the past two
decades, various members of the Court have expressed increasing doubts
about the sustainability of the American death penalty. Justice Black-
95. Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra note 76.
96. Id.
97. Murder Rates Nationally and by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/murder-rates-nationally-and-state (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
98. Kent Scheidegger, Death Sentencing Rates, CRIME & CONSEQUENCES (Dec. 14, 2010,
2:53 PM), http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2010/12/death-sentencing-rates.html.
99. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
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mun, a dissenter in Furman and a member of the Court that upheld the
new statutes in 1976, lamented, just prior to his retirement, that legal
regulation of the death penalty had been unsuccessful on its own
terms. 10 He announced he would "no longer.., tinker with the machin-
ery of death" because of the failure of contemporary regulation to solve
the problems of arbitrariness and discrimination that justified the Court's
intervention in the first place.l10 More recently, Justice Stevens likewise
concluded that the death penalty was no longer constitutionally via-
ble.102 In Justice Stevens' view, the incapacitation justification for the
death penalty has been undercut by the introduction of LWOP, the deter-
rence justification lacks empirical support, and the retributive justifica-
tion cannot be squared with the trend toward humanizing executions. 1
0 3
Other justices have also recently authored opinions lamenting the failure
of contemporary regulation to achieve its avowed goals' 04 or to be suffi-
ciently responsive to accuracy concerns in light of demonstrated error in
capital cases. 10 5
Perhaps more importantly, the Court's proportionality cases have
developed a new methodology for gauging "evolving standards of
decency," and the new measures are particularly hospitable to judicial
abolition, especially if more states were to reject the penalty. In Atkins v.
Virginia, the Court imposed a proportionality bar against executing per-
sons with mental retardation, despite the fact that a majority of death
penalty states permitted the punishment. 0 6 The Court noted that the
absolute number of states prohibiting the practice was less significant
than the "consistency of the direction of change."10 7 Hence, if several
more jurisdictions were to defect to the "abolitionist" or "repeal" camp,
the Court might view such movement as significant evidence of contem-
porary rejection of the practice altogether. In subsequent decisions, the
Court imposed additional proportionality limitations on the death pen-
100. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
101. Id.
102. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Despite
this conclusion, Justice Stevens did agree that under the current constitutional framework the
lethal injection protocol at issue did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 87.
103. Id. at 78-81.
104. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-19 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (cataloging the defects in prevailing capital practice notwithstanding the Court's
regulation and urging a requirement that jurors-not judges-make the ultimate determination
whether to impose the death penalty).
105. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207-10 (2006) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (calling for a new capital jurisprudence informed by the lessons of
wrongful convictions).
106. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315, 321 (2002).
107. Id. at 315.
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
alty, precluding the execution of juveniles" 8 and of persons convicted of
non-homicidal, ordinary offenses (including the rape of a child). 09
These decisions reflect a shift in emphasis from the number of states
embracing a practice to other indicia of prevailing values, including
expert opinion, international opinion, polling data, and actual practices.
The declining and exceedingly rare use of the death penalty on the
ground, in light of these decisions, constitutes powerful evidence of its
inconsistency with prevailing moral norms (not to mention expert and
international opinion, which are increasingly aligned against capital
punishment).
Thus, the modern project of regulating the death penalty has
increasingly provided a framework for revisiting the constitutionality of
the death penalty itself. Indeed, the legal regulation of the death penalty,
adopted as an alternative to constitutional abolition, has provided a yard-
stick for measuring the death penalty's success. A decision invalidating
the death penalty in the early 1970s would have been marked as an
abrupt break from prevailing legal norms given the total absence of legal
regulation of capital punishment up to that point. Today, the Court can
highlight the aspirations of the new legal framework and emphasize the
distance between the prevailing reality and those aspirations, much in
the way Justices Blackmun and Stevens renounced their constitutional
support for the death penalty notwithstanding their prior endorsement of
the post-Furman schemes.
A number of recent death-penalty scholars have noted the oddity of
our prevailing system, in which the death penalty seems ill-suited to
survive given the demands of contemporary legal norms and the accom-
panying crushing costs. David Garland, for example, describes the pre-
sent American death penalty as "peculiar" given that "the forms through
which it is now enacted seem ambivalent and poorly adapted to the
stated purposes of criminal justice."" 0 Franklin Zimring likewise high-
lights the "contradiction" between the values underlying the death pen-
alty and those required of due process.II But neither of these scholars
appeared particularly sanguine about the prospects for abolition in the
near future. In Garland's view, the death penalty, dysfunctional though it
is, nonetheless serves social purposes other than those advertised and in
any case is insulated from total abolition by the decentralization of
authority over criminal law." 2 Zimring, writing almost a decade ago,
108. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
109. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008).
110. GARLAND, supra note 17, at 13.
111. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 130
(2003).
112. See GARLAND, supra note 17, at 184-86.
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was observing the zenith of capital sentencing and executions, and
though he expressed confidence in the eventual abolition of the death
penalty," 3 the trajectory of the late 1990s did not seem promising.
Today, the conflict between the legal regulation of the death penalty and
its continued use appears more permanent and more destructive than the
early decades of regulation would have predicted. In short, the modem
American death penalty-with its unprecedented costs, alternatives, and
legal regulatory framework-seems newly vulnerable to judicial invali-
dation. Reform of the death penalty and its abolition might well be on
the same path.
113. ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 205 (stating that "the ultimate outcome [of abolition] seems
inevitable in any but the most pessimistic view of the American future").
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